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Abstract
IRMA is an abbreviation for “I Reveal My Attributes”, and at the same time it is
the name of a project run by the Digital Security group of the University of Nijmegen
and its partners to get attribute-based identity management up and running. This
hands-on approach forces us to elaborate many unexplored issues, leading to a better
understanding of attributes and their possibilities and challenges.
Cryptographic techniques that enable secure and privacy-friendly attribute-based au-
thentication have been around for more than a decade, see [4, 6, 7, 9]. But what is new
is that the latest generation of smart cards is powerful enough to perform the required
(non-trivial) cryptographic operations in an adequately efficient manner [10]. Hence only
now we see efforts to actually deploy attributes in practice, like the IRMA project1 at
Nijmegen. Two other pilot projects should be mentioned, both of which are carried out
by the EU-sponsored ABC4Trust consortium [5]. The Swedish pilot [3] gives anonymous
access for elementary school pupils to on-line resources (e.g., chat room), while the Greek
pilot [1] enables university students to evaluate lectures anonymously. In both cases eli-
gibility and privacy are of primary importance. Although the IRMA pilot uses the same
underlying technology, the objective of our research is more general as we investigate a
broad variety of attributes and applications. The associated kind of challenges does not
appear in these ABC4Trust pilots since each focusses on a single context.
This document gives a brief overview of some of the more salient aspects of the IRMA
project.
First of all, attributes are used in a very broad sense as describing some property
of a person. This property may be anonymous (non-identifying), such as your gender,
or whether or not you are over 18, but in the IRMA context it may also identify you,
for example when the attribute is your bank account or social security number. While
the underlying technology provides full unlinkability, the attribute values may provide
linkability. This usage of identifying attributes may go against the original intention that
attributes should be anonymous, but extending their interpretation to (partial) identi-
fication greatly extends the application scenarios. For instance, we foresee registration
and status attributes for medical personnel (giving access to medical files), for employees
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(giving access to premises, networks, and PCs), and for customers (giving benefits, and
online access to their purchase/bonus history). Additionally, attributes may be used for
a micro medical dossier, with essential (emergency) information.
Second, the IRMA project uses a smart card implementation [10] based on the Idemix
technology [8]. However, the essential feature involved is selective disclosure of only a
limited number (possibly only one) attributes, while hiding all other attributes. This
focus on the core of the credential technology—using zero knowledge proofs—means that
the system allows high level interfaces, beneath which other implementations, such as
U-Prove, can also be employed. As a simplified view of the technology and the concepts,
we may say that “credentials are issued and attributes are shown”. Thus, at this stage,
only a small part of the power of Idemix is actually used on IRMA cards. Future upgrades
may involve more functionality.
Next, the extensive use of all kinds of attributes within IRMA leads to dependencies
between these attributes: attribute X can only be issued after attribute Y has been veri-
fied. As an example, before you can receive an attribute stating what your bank account
or mobile phone number is, you need to authenticate properly. This authentication may
involve a mixture of already issued attributes on your IRMA card (like your name and
date of birth) and out-of-band communication (like a one-time SMS code). These depend-
encies lead to a tree structure for attributes. An interesting question then arises: what
should be the “root” attributes that do not depend on any other attributes on the card. It
turns out that this question has deep implications for the “identity fabric” in our society.
For instance, one can image that your Facebook identifier is issued as an attribute, so that
you can use your IRMA card as Facebook login. But should this Facebook attribute be
root, or not? If it is a root, it cannot depend on any other attributes, and must be issued
purely via out-of-band authentication. But if it is not a root, it will typically depend on
your name and date of birth attributes; in that case one can no longer have a pseudonym
Facebook account, enforcing Facebook’s real name policy.
Finally, who should decide about such delicate issues? We foresee an independent,
non-profit foundation that runs the IRMA scheme and sets such policy issues. Also, this
foundation should do the certificate management that regulates access to the card, both
for issuing and verification of credentials. Within the IRMA project there is close coordin-
ation with both public and private parties to openly discuss such issues. Ongoing work
involves a (experimental) connection between existing government identity management
infrastructures and IRMA cards, for the issuing of credentials based on government data.
The use of a wide variety of attributes leads to a new activity that we label as “cre-
dential design”. It involves the organisation of individual attributes in signed containers
(credentials), with dependencies between them. In the IRMA set-up a credential contains
at most four (related) attributes, such as first name, family name, full names, initials.
Our experience so far leads to the following principles of credential design.
1. Attributes in one credential form a coherent set.
2. Each attribute in one credential falls under the responsibiility of a single most au-
thoritative issuer.
3. Attribute duplication (same content, multiple issuers) should be avoided.
4. Verifiers should only be able to read a limited, predefined set of attributes.
5. Credential dependencies should be public.
6. An independent non-profit scheme manager should decide about such dependencies.
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